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WAR, AND STATE MAKING AT THE END OF EMPIRE:  
OTTOMAN COLLAPSE AND THE FORMATION OF THE BALKAN STATES 
 
by Klejda Mulaj 
 
While the connection between war and state making in the ascendency of the Western state 
system has been well explored, the war-state linkages in the peripheries of the Great Powers, 
especially in times of imperial decline and collapse, have attracted insufficient attention 
amongst peace and conflict studies analysts. What is missing in the literature is an explicit 
and focused comparison between state formation in the non-Western sphere and in Western 
Europe, which has provided the template for modern state making in the rest of the world. 
Moreover, there is limited realization that outside Western Europe the state has not been the 
offspring of the nation; on the contrary, the reverse has been the case. Modern state 
formation—more often than not—has been grounded in the violence of war which has 
brought into being that which national leaders have claimed war reflects, that is, the nation. 
This contribution helps reinforce this missing realization in peace and conflict studies by 
revisiting the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 in order to underpin correlations between state 
making and political violence, and their mediation by the exclusivist ideology of ethnic 
nationalism and growing Great Power influence. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
It is widely accepted that the study of war is essential to the pursuit of peace. Indeed, a 
substantial part of peace studies is dedicated to the understanding of the nature and character 
of war in particular, and conflict in general. It is because peace studies investigates causes 
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and consequences of conflicts, as well as preconditions for peace, that the discipline is also 
known as peace and conflict studies.
1
 War and peace have greatly conditioned humans and 
their institutions and forms of organization as much as humans have shaped war and peace. 
But it is one actor in particular, namely the state, that in modern times has been most 
frequently at the very center of the war-peace nexus. Implicitly, a study on state making 
connects to peacebuilding because states are the main institutionalized actors that build 
peace.
2
 But they are also mostly responsible for waging wars.
3
 States have been, and continue 
to be, responsible for initiating wars, their execution, and also their termination, in which 
processes states themselves have aggrandized, contracted, and sometimes disintegrated. 
 
Many great thinkers on the problem of war, from Heraclitus to Machiavelli to Charles Tilly, 
have stressed this inherent connection between war and the state.
4
 They have offered critical 
contributions which interpret war as one of the most enduring ways of effecting change in the 
political arena. Although costly, war has been perceived as a rational means at the hands of 
the state in pursuit of official interests defined in terms of state and national security, such as 
control of territories and their population and resources. In the course of the ascendancy of 
the state system, especially in Western European history, war making and state making have 
been intrinsically linked, a phenomenon which has found expression in many works 
concerned especially with the behavior of the Great Powers in wartime.
5
 However, the war 
and state making linkage in the peripheries of the Great Powers, especially in crucial times 
such as those associated with imperial decline and collapse, has not attracted sufficient 
attention from analysts.  
 
What is missing from peace studies is an explicit and focused comparison between state 
formation in the Western Europe and non-Western sphere, and a realization that outside 
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Western Europe the state has not been the offspring of the nation. Moreover, the formation of 
states has been grounded in the violence of war which has involved—as Jacques Derrida 
suggests—a performative force, a coup de force, in the sense that the founding of a nation, 
state, or nation-state consists in a fiction or simulacrum “that brings to daylight … that which 
one claims to reflect … the unity of a nation, the founding of a state, while one is in the act of 
producing that event.”6 This article uses the case of the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 to 
underpin correlations between state making and political violence with reference to some 
distinctive features of state formation processes related to the spatial definition of new states 
and nations and role of Great Powers pertaining to these wars. It shows that the simulacrum 
identified above has not been produced exclusively by the elites of the nation but has been 
conditioned, modified, and shaped by Great Power diplomacy. The focus of this study 
therefore is upon the initial phases of state formation (or state making) in the south-east 
corner of the European continent.  
 
In conformity with the interdisciplinary practice of peace and conflict studies, the analysis 
engages with sources from sociology, political science, history, and anthropology. It is 
grounded in a reading of existing literature on war and state formation in Western Europe due 
to the fact that the Western nation state model has served as a template for the creation of 
modern Balkan states. Central to its analysis, however, are the main subject matters of peace 
and conflict studies, namely, peace, power, conflict, and violence—matters that in the war 
and state making setting of the Balkans have been frequently integrated in combustible forms. 
 
In the short interval of a few months two historic wars engulfed the Balkan peninsula in the 
years 1912 and 1913. The first one (October 1912—May 1913) was fought by Bulgaria, 
Greece, Montenegro and Serbia (a coalition known as the Balkan League) against the 
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Ottoman Empire. The second war (June—July 1913) was initiated by Bulgaria against Serbia 
and Greece, which, in coalition, defeated Bulgarian troops and redistributed the contested 
territory of Ottoman Macedonia mostly amongst the winners.
7
 Hence, in the wake of these 
wars, a new interconnection emerged between territory and people, and new state boundaries 
established by means of force were incorporated in international treaties. As demarcation 
lines, borders manifested claims of state authority and territoriality, providing officials with a 
point of reference within which their activities were authorized. State boundaries became 
crucially important not only for what they contained (human, economic, and geo-strategic 
resources which constituted important factors of state strength and identity) but also for 
leaving outside desired territories and co-ethnics, exclusions that gave way to persistent 
irredentist claims.
8
 
 
The analysis begins by identifying common and distinctive trends in the processes of state 
formation in Western Europe and South East Europe (aka the Balkans). It emphasizes that 
war as “a social institution that utilizes military force and coercion for political purposes”9 
has had strong impact on the formation of states in South East Europe just like in the West. 
However, both the international (external) and national contexts of state making in the West 
and East of the European continent have differed noticeably. With regard to the external 
context, processes of state making have become increasingly more impacted by the influence, 
and interference, of Great Powers; whereas with regard to the internal setting challenges of 
nationalism and politicization of ethnic heterogeneity have been distinctive features of state 
making in South East Europe unlike the case of Western Europe.  
 
After setting the stage by identifying commonalities and differences of state formation in 
South East and Western Europe, the analysis gauges the causes of the Balkan Wars. It 
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explores, also, how politicization of ethnic heterogeneity complicated nation-state making 
efforts and how violence acted as a tool of delineating state boundaries. In the next step, the 
analysis considers explicitly external processes of state-making with reference to the role of 
the Great Powers. It shows that the decline of the Ottoman Empire presented the Great 
Powers of the time—Austria-Hungary, Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Russia—
with opportunities for influencing the Balkan states, but also with risks of confrontation and 
therefore challenges to the security and stability of the region and the continent. Exerting 
strong influence on the Balkan parties, the Great Powers aimed to direct the impeding change 
towards outcomes that would satisfy their interests while at the same time trying to 
accommodate (competing) aspirations of nationalist elites. In conclusion, the article 
summarizes the distinctive trends of state formation in the Balkans and emphasizes the need 
for incorporating (aspects of) state building and nation building in a comprehensive analysis 
of state making, an integration which is minimally present in the existing accounts of the 
formation of states in the West and, by extension, within the field of peace and conflict 
studies.  
 
Common and distinctive trends in state formation of Western and South-East Europe 
In his seminal analysis of state making in the European continent Charles Tilly argued that 
“from AD 990 onwards, major mobilizations for war provided the chief occasion on which 
states expanded, consolidated, and created new forms of political organization.”10 Those with 
substantial means used force to get compliance and multiple goods and advantages denied to 
less powerful people. Europeans followed what Tilly calls a “standard war-provoking logic”: 
those who controlled substantial coercive means sought to maintain a secure area within 
which returns from coercion could be enjoyed and surround it with a fortified buffer zone. 
Armed forces patrolled the buffer zone and sought to turn it into a secure area while 
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concurrently venturing outside it. In the process the buffer zone turned into a secure area, 
which “encouraged the wielder of coercion in order to acquire a new buffer zone surrounding 
the old. So long as adjacent powers were pursuing the same logic, war resulted.”11 This is an 
important depiction of the relation between coercion and acquisition of territory in the West 
that has great relevance to other regions including the Balkans. 
 
In an earlier work, Tilly and his collaborators paid attention to success in war and its impact 
on state making. They found that the building of an effective military machine—the army—
promoted “territorial consolidation, centralization, differentiation of the instruments of 
government and monopolization of the means of coercion, all the fundamental state-making 
processes.” Put differently, “war made the state, and the state made war.”12 In particular, 
“wars became the principal means by which the realignments of the participants and their 
boundaries occurred, the principal moments at which multiple changes of membership and 
alliance occurred, as well as principal occasions on which the relations between rulers and 
ruled changed rapidly.”13 Until the  eighteenth century European statesmen did not spend 
much time anticipating or attending to popular demands. While establishing direct rule, 
European states shifted from reactive to proactive repression. Rebellions were punished 
forcibly. Civilian populations were disarmed. At the same time, within their boundaries states 
undertook to impose national languages, national educational systems, and national military 
services. Externally, European states controlled movements across boundaries and treated 
foreigners as distinctive kinds of peoples entitled only to limited rights. Consequently, Tilly 
concludes, “life homogenized within states and heterogenized among states. … War itself 
became a homogenizing experience, as soldiers and sailors represented the entire nation and 
the civilian population endured common … responsibilities.”14  
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War settlements codified national borders and realignments of identities first in Europe and 
then beyond. In 1500 European states held political control over about 7 percent of the earth’s 
land, 35 percent in 1800, and 84 percent in 1914.
15
 Thus the national state served as a 
template for state formation in the rest of the world. Moreover, the expansion of this template 
ensured a move from “a relatively ‘internal’ to a strongly ‘external’” state formation process– 
a trend that has continued and accelerated through to the present era.
16
  As Tilly notes:  
 
[C]ompacts of powerful states have increasingly narrowed the limits within which any 
national struggle for power occurred. They have done so through imposition of 
international war settlements, … diffusion of standard models for armies, 
bureaucracies, and other elements of the state apparatus, creation of international 
organizations charged with tending the state system, collective guarantee of national 
borders, and intervention to maintain domestic order. That narrowing restricted the 
alternative paths of state formation. Throughout the world state formation converged 
on the more or less deliberate construction of national states … according to models 
offered, subsidised, and enforced by the great powers.
17
 
 
Samuel Finer has opined that national states—in the European image—have come to acquire 
five salient characteristics: (1) they are territorially defined populations that recognize a 
common paramount organ of government; (2) the government consists of specialized 
personnel; the civil service that carries out government’s decisions and the military service 
that backs these by force where necessary; (3) each state is recognized by other states as 
independent in its action upon its subjects (a recognition that constitutes “international 
sovereignty”); (4) the population residing within the state forms a community of feeling 
based on self-consciousness of a common nationality; and (5) the population forms a 
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community in the sense that—in principle, at least—its members mutually distribute and 
share duties and benefits.
18
 The first three characteristics are constitutive features of state 
building whereas the last two are associated with nation building. For the purposes of 
terminology clarification, it is worth noting that state building involves territoriality and 
function (closely associated with workings of government institutions), whereas nation 
building refers to processes whereby state elites render the boundaries of the state congruent 
with those of the nation.
19
  
 
The above mentioned five characteristics of modern states find expression in the notion of 
stateness, which can be conceived as a feature of statehood. As the European model of state 
expanded, the world has moved gradually towards stateness, in that, the processes of state 
making have centered on “consolidation of territorial control, differentiation of governments 
from other organizations, acquisition of autonomy (and mutual recognition thereof) by some 
governments, centralization and coordination.”20 By the nineteenth century virtually all West 
European governments had arrived at “a relatively high level of stateness, measured by 
formal autonomy, differentiation from nongovernmental organizations, centralization, and 
internal coordination.”21 However, by this time most of the present Balkan states were just 
embarking on initial processes that would eventually lead them to statehood in the course of 
the disintegration of the Ottoman rule. 
 
In terms of demography, in both Western and Eastern Europe state formation proceeded over 
large predominantly peasant masses. This feature—the predominantly peasant composition of 
populations—accrued added value to territory due to the fact that a great part of resources 
that could be used for state building were land-related. In addition, the predominance of 
peasantry implied that co-opting the class of landlords was crucial to states’ efforts to access 
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land resources that this class controlled. The peasantry of the Western states was relatively 
homogenous in cultural terms (some suggest as early as 1300)
22
 due to processes of 
unification under the Roman Empire and (deliberate) institution by state elites of a national 
language, a state religion, mass public instruction, and sometimes expulsion of ethnic 
minorities.  
 
It bears emphasizing that what is stressed here is relative homogeneity rather than full 
homogeneity. It cannot be denied that the West was, and remains, diverse. It is not assumed 
here that Western populations were fully homogenous by nineteenth century but that in 
relative terms they were more homogenous than nations living under Ottoman rule. Hence, 
throughout, this study refers to populations in Western states as “relatively homogeneous” 
rather than “homogenous.” A brief glimpse at the complex picture of interethnic mingling in 
the Ottoman Empire illustrates the utility of drawing this distinction. The free movement of 
people within a land empire without hard national boundaries enabled a far greater mingling 
of nationalities than was the case among the states of Western Europe. Just before the onset 
of the First Balkan War, out of six million inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire who lived in 
Europe, around 3.5 million were Orthodox Christians (Bulgarian, Serb, and Greek) and 2.3 
million Muslims (of various backgrounds).
23
 National identities among Christians, however, 
were not so clear-cut. Although some Christians would have identified as Bulgarian, Serb, or 
Greek, national identities were not well-formed among much of the Christian population and 
it was not uncommon for their national affiliations to shift. In stark contrast to Eugen 
Weber’s finding that as late as 1870, when about one quarter the inhabitants of France did not 
speak French, most “knew themselves to be French subjects (even as whole regions felt “little 
identity with the state or with other regions”), minorities in the Balkan states frequently 
refrained from designating themselves as subjects of the state in which they lived.
24
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The relative homogeneity of populations in the Western Europe was a facilitating factor in 
the emergence of West European national states especially because it eased the division of 
lands into exclusive territories (although some of them were subjected to subsequent change). 
Furthermore, this relative homogeneity facilitated construction of unified states by lowering 
the cost of state making insofar as it rendered uniform administrative arrangements feasible, 
promoted loyalty and solidarity of subject population, and made uniform communication 
systems available to the rulers.
25
  In the long run, the relative cultural homogeneity of the 
population residing within the boundaries of a given (Western) state eased the task of nation 
building—the development of national consciousness and commitment to one’s nation and 
one’s state. Samuel Finer’s definition of the state mentioned above incorporates nation 
building in the conception and practice of state making. But Charles Tilly has insisted on “the 
analytic separation of state-building from nation-building” in the context of analyzing state 
formation in Western Europe because, here, nation building generally occurred after the 
formation of strong states.
26
 This analytic separation may be justified in the Western 
European setting where a relative cultural homogeneity was attained early on at the outset of 
state making. Nevertheless, when state formation proceeds over largely heterogeneous 
populations as in the case of the Balkans, nation building becomes an intrinsic part of state 
making. Therefore, analyzing processes of state formation that proceed over largely 
heterogeneous populations warrants taking into consideration both aspects of state building 
and nation building. 
 
Given that Western states acquired relative homogeneity in early stages of their state 
formation, which in turn facilitated drawing of boundaries and governance of populations, it 
is to be expected that nationalism—as an ideology that advocates congruence between the 
state boundaries and ethnic identity of the people who live within them
27
 — did not play a 
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crucial role in Western states formation processes. Indeed, it is from the French Revolution 
onwards that national or ethnic identity became important bases of mass mobilization. It 
follows, therefore, that nationalism (as a modern ideology) appeared only in the late stages of 
West European state formation, by which time Western states had already acquired a strong 
level of stateness. This is not the case with state formation in the Balkans. The latter 
processes of state formation—in the  nineteenth and  twentieth centuries—coincided with the 
consolidation, utilization, and manipulation of nationalist ideology, as will be emphasized 
below.
28
  
 
The time frames within which national states emerged in Western Europe and South East 
Europe provide, perhaps, the greatest contrast between the formation of states in the West and 
East of the European continent. Western states had a great advantage in terms of available 
time—measured in centuries—in addressing, adjusting, and molding challenges encountered 
in the processes of establishing their states. In South East Europe the formation of states was 
compressed in time, with modern states emerging in the nineteenth and  twentieth centuries 
following the decline and eventual collapse of the Ottoman Empire that ruled these lands for 
nearly five centuries: Serbia between 1815 and 1830, Greece in 1830, Romania in 1862, and 
Montenegro and Bulgaria in 1878 with several wars altering their boundaries subsequently, 
and Albania and Turkey emerging at the end of the Balkan Wars of 1912-13.
29
 Sydney Verba 
notes of this interval that “[w]hat Britain took centuries to do—solve the problems of 
identity, legitimacy, participation, and distribution—the new nations have to do in the briefest 
span of time.”30 This simple observation contains an important fact, namely that in the short 
span of time in which Balkan states were formed their national elites were faced with a 
crucial cumulation of both state building and nation building challenges as they strived to 
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cope with contested claims to territory and ethnic heterogeneity in addition to final struggles 
with the Ottoman Empire and competing Great Powers’ interests.  
 
Stein Rokkan has observed that this cumulation of challenges during the final struggle for 
secession from the empire and formation of national states constitutes a fundamental contrast 
between the older Western systems and the newer systems emerging from the breakup of 
great empires. 
 
[T]he latecomers were not only late in achieving sovereign status, they were left with 
only a minimum of time to build up their institutions before they were faced with 
disruptive pressures from outside as well as from inside. The older systems developed 
in a multicentered international environment without any dominant models of 
successful development, with very slow transportation networks, and without any 
technologies for quick mass mobilization. The latecomers were faced with highly 
visible models of successful development, strong and polarized outside centres of 
economic and ideological influence, rapid means of communication in and out of each 
system, advanced technologies of mass mobilization.
31
  
 
To sum up, this concise overview of key texts on state formation in Western Europe suggests 
that war is the characteristic condition of the state system in so far as major mobilizations for 
war, and success in war, have provided the principal occasion for creation, expansion and 
consolidation of modern states. The older national states of Western Europe established a 
relative cultural homogeneity and acquired a great level of stateness early in the process of 
state formation and prior to the age of nationalism. In contrast, as will be elaborated below, 
the latecomers in the state system—such as the Balkan states—were faced with immense 
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challenges both to state- and nation building as they struggled to resolve competing claims to 
territory and proceeded to construct nations over fluid, heterogeneous ethnic groups, while 
simultaneously contesting the Ottoman rule and courting support of the Great Powers. While 
the analysis of state formation in Western Europe provided by Tilly and his collaborators 
could afford to neglect “ethnic fragmentation”32 and “the international context of any 
particular [Western] state’s emergence and growth”33 such neglect could be a grave error 
when analyzing the emergence of Balkan states. Grounding the analysis in the existing 
literature of state formation in Western Europe—a model that became the template for state 
formation in the rest of the world—this section has identified distinctive aspects of state 
making in the Balkan setting. The ensuing sections will explore conditions of state making in 
the context of the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 with the view of casting into sharper relief those 
distinctive aspects referred to above.  
 
ON THE CAUSES OF THE BALKAN WARS 
The causes of the First and Second Balkan Wars are not easy to relate in the limited space 
available here.
34
 This section, however, identifies the main factors that paved the way to these 
wars. It shows that the conditions that produced the Balkan Wars of early twentieth century 
were characterized by the increasing influence of nationalism, especially in its irredentist 
form
35
 and heavy involvement of Great Powers of the time—Austria-Hungary, Germany, 
Great Britain, France, Italy, and Russia. This section gives particular attention to the former 
aspect. The role of the Great Powers in the formation of Balkan states will be considered in 
greater detail in the next section.  
 
The Balkan Wars of 1912-13, and the entire process of national state formation in South East 
Europe, cannot be understood outside the framework of the Eastern Question, that is, 
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problems created by the decline and gradual dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the 
attempts of the Great Powers to delineate their spheres of influence in the territories of this 
empire by means of creating proxy states.
36
 These problems persisted for a century and a half 
prior to the Ottoman collapse and constituted the most intractable diplomatic issue of this 
time. The more the empire declined the more economic and strategic interests of the Great 
Powers in its territories entangled. Great Power rivalries placed the Balkans at the very center 
of the Eastern Question and the endeavors of powerful states to address it.
37
 
 
The weakening of the Ottoman Empire manifested itself in a systematic loss of territories in 
the  nineteenth century when the Ottomans ceded large tracts of North Africa to the British 
and the French. In Europe, amidst an eleven-year-long secessionist war, the Greek state 
emerged in 1830. Serbian, Montenegrin and Romanian nationalists engaged in a number of 
revolts achieving secession from the Ottoman Empire in 1878 following the end of the 
Russo-Turkish War (1877-78, in which they sided with Russia).
38
 The latter war, together 
with the Turco-Italian War (1911-1912, known also as the Libyan War)— both of which the 
Ottomans lost—were historic events with dire repercussions for the survival of the empire. 
With regard to the latter, the Ottoman defeat in Libya had imminent consequences in denting 
Ottoman prestige and exposing Ottoman military weakness, which ultimately encouraged the 
Balkan states to attack the Ottoman forces in October 1912. The Ottoman defeat in the war 
with Russia had direct repercussions for the decline of the Empire and the nurturing of the 
Balkan nationalism and national states.   
 
The San Stefano Treaty of March 3, 1878 that concluded the Russo-Turkish War established 
an extensive Bulgarian state (that included Macedonia and a large section of eastern 
Balkans), with Russian geopolitical interests playing a large role in the delineation of new 
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borders.
39
 Montenegro was also a winner; it nearly tripled its territory. But the peace treaty 
signed at San Stefano jeopardized interests of European Great Powers, which were concerned 
about the prospects of Russian domination of the Balkans.
40
 In addition, the San Stefano 
Treaty created political friction between Bulgarian nationalists, on the one hand, and their 
Greek and Serb counterparts, on the other, for the remainder of the nineteenth century and 
throughout the twentieth; Bulgarians saw the San Stefano Treaty as a vindication of their 
rights over extensive territories, while Greeks and Serbs were alarmed because they laid 
claim to lands assigned to Bulgaria. Pressured by Austro-Hungary to revise the terms of the 
San-Stefano Treaty, the Russians agreed to revisions. Talks ensued in a Congress held in 
Berlin from June 13—July 13, 1878. 
 
The Treaty of Berlin partitioned Bulgaria, with Macedonia and the province of Eastern 
Rumelia being restored to the Ottomans (the latter reverted to Bulgaria in 1885). Such was 
the extent of changes that Bulgaria’s borders sanctioned in Berlin incorporated only 37.5 
percent of Bulgarian territory agreed at San Stefano. Henceforth, “the new Bulgarian state 
was to enter into life with a ready-made programme for territorial expansion and a burning 
sense of the injustice meted out to it by the Great Powers.”41 Whilst Macedonia had stood 
outside general political evaluations of the Balkans until this point, with the Berlin Treaty 
Macedonia entered the international political stage for good. Indeed, to a considerable degree, 
Balkan diplomacy after 1878 revolved around the question of division of Macedonia amongst 
Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia. Article 23 of the Berlin Treaty conditioned restoration of 
Macedonia to the Ottoman Empire upon reform and provision of religious (read Christian) 
liberties. Six Great Powers were granted the right to intervene in Macedonian affairs in order 
to supervise reform implementation. On the one hand, these provisions encouraged 
aspirations of Christians for independence from the Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, these 
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very nationalist aspirations induced the Ottoman authorities to delay or obstruct the 
demanded reform.
42
 This clash of interests did not bode well for success of reform. 
Moreover, the half-hearted measures adopted by imperial authorities came to be opposed by 
local Muslims who saw reform threatening their position. The growing dependency of the 
Ottoman Empire on European powers, loss of wars with Russia and Italy, internal dissent and 
revolt, and lack of reform, weakened the empire beyond repair.
43
  
 
Numerous local uprisings against the empire further dented the authority and ability of the 
Ottoman government, also known as “the Porte,” to run and control Balkan lands. One 
significant revolt—prior to the Balkan Wars—was the Ilinden Uprising in Macedonia in 1903 
(carried out by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization—funded by the 
Bulgarian government). Another was the Kosovar Albanian revolt in 1910 led by Isa Boletini 
and Idriz Seferi against Young Turks’ policy of raising taxes, adaptation of Turkish as the 
language of provincial administration, disarming Albanians and conscripting them in the 
Ottoman Army. A subsequent Albanian revolt the following year showed the impossibility of 
maintaining the unity of population of the Ottoman Empire, even the unity of Muslim 
communities. This realization stimulated Turkish nationalism. Towards these uprisings the 
Ottomans reacted with overwhelming force which in turn alienated further the local 
population. These factors are widely considered to have paved the way for the Balkan Wars 
1912-1913.  
 
Wesley Hiers and Andreas Wimmer have argued convincingly that “the weakening of empire 
by previous nation-state formations or nationalist wars of liberation in other parts of the 
empire further promote the creation of nation-states.”44 Their study found that nationalist 
movements have played an important role in all cases of imperial collapse. At the same time, 
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nationalism can profit from the weakening of empire brought about, for instance, by wars lost 
by empires or the nationalist wars of liberation fought in its territory. Sociological analyses of 
the relationship between war and nationalism emphasize the importance of longue durée 
processes on the emergence of both nationalism and war. In the case of the Balkans, Siniša 
Malešević has suggested that: 
 
[T]he intensive and, for the most part, highly coercive state building programmes 
brought about spectacular organizational changes so that by the end of  nineteenth 
century and the beginning of the twentieth, most Balkan states had changed beyond 
recognition. The increasing cumulative bureaucratization of coercion resulted in the 
creation of massive state apparatuses: all Balkan polities had introduced universal 
conscription, established military academies, increased military budgets and set up 
large armies. For example between 1872 and 1895 the Greek officer corps expanded 
by 240 percent and the size of its army was constantly rising so that by the beginning 
of the 20th century it amounted to 150,000 soldiers; in Serbia in just ten years (1893-
1903) the military grew fourfold, while the Bulgarian army was exponentially 
increasing. The result was that by the beginning of the First Balkan War [1912] these 
three small states were able to mobilize up to a million soldiers.
45
 
 
In other words, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Balkans experienced a 
systematic increase in the organizational and coercive capacity of the state, which is a crucial 
precondition for waging war.  
 
Unlike the case of Western Europe where states existed long before the era of nationalism, 
state formation in the south eastern part of the continent occurred in the age of nationalism 
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when mass political participation was a key instrument of legitimation. Nationalism was “the 
hegemonic discourse of sovereignty”, an indispensable language of those playing the game of 
statehood.
46
 As Theodora Dragostinova has observed, “speaking national” became a useful 
frame of reference for both official policies and ordinary people’s demands. Invocation of the 
nation brought together large masses of people with various understandings of nationality and 
non-uniform expectations from the nation state. Officials used national arguments as a 
discourse of entitlement, a justification for their authority over claimed territories, whereas 
ordinary people employed the national idiom in their encounters with the administrators, 
hoping to improve their precarious situations within aggressively nationalizing states.
47
 On 
the face of it, the language of nationalism— “speaking national” —camouflages the fact that 
in the  nineteenth and early  twentieth centuries the Balkan peasantry, who constituted the 
majority of the population, had no clear idea of national belonging as they tended to identify 
with the local (as opposed to the national) or a broader community of believers (religion). 
The difficulty of assigning nationality (membership in the national community) allowed 
national activism to play a crucial role both prior to the fighting and during its course. It is 
striking how in grappling with the difficulty of assigning nationality, opposing nationalist 
campaigns of Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbs developed interrelated and similar tactics to 
achieve (irreconcilable) policies aiming at national unity—tactics and policies epitomized in 
the struggle over control of Ottoman Macedonia.  
 
Macedonia was the typical Ottoman space, with mixed groups living side by side observing 
their religion. Until as late as the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, no such thing as a Macedonian 
identity yet existed and regional states claimed that the inhabitants of Macedonia were 
Bulgarian, Greek, or Serbs. The local population spoke a Slavic dialect that resembled the 
Bulgarian language. Serbs claimed that population of Macedonia was Serbian because their 
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folk customs were similar to those of the Serbs. Greece claimed that the Slavic population of 
Macedonia were Slavic-speaking Greeks because they were Orthodox Christians.
48
 Within 
such a setting, locals had no strong national convictions. Their national identification was 
volatile and they frequently changed their professed national loyalties. British journalist H. N. 
Brailsfors noted this phenomenon when he travelled to Macedonia between 1902 and 1904, 
writing,  “It is not uncommon to find fathers who are themselves officially ‘Greeks’, equally 
proud of bringing into the world ‘Greek’, ‘Serbian’, ‘Bulgarian’, and ‘Rumanian’ children. … 
I was talking to a wealthy peasant. … ‘Is your village Greek’, I asked him, ‘or Bulgarian?’ 
‘Well’”, he replied, “it is Bulgarian now but four years ago it was Greek. The answer seemed 
to him natural and commonplace.”49  
 
Diverse demography and an intensely local sense of identity created insurmountable 
obstacles for national movements seeking to delineate national boundaries in a highly 
multiethnic environment. The scramble for Macedonia was a formative event for Bulgaria, 
Greece, and Serbia as a struggle to redeem what supposedly belonged to the nation, and to 
place inhabitants of Macedonia into national frames. Each nationalist movement sought to 
undercut the influence of their counterparts among the local population by sponsoring schools 
run in their respective national language, philanthropic institutions, political organizations, 
and armed bands which worked to secure recruits for their respective national agendas.
50
  
 
Civil unrest, in the form of violence and lawlessness, was rampant. John Lampe has aptly 
noted that “Macedonia was the prototype for a powder keg.”51 He traces vulnerabilities of 
Macedonia to the creation of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, or Exarchate in 1870—
generally accepted as the origin of the so called Macedonian Question, which became the 
litmus test for the ability of the three above mentioned national movements to achieve their 
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national aspirations.
52
 These national movements articulated their agendas not exclusively 
against the Ottoman Empire but also in opposition to each other. While their competition in 
the first half of the nineteenth century centred on education, in the second half national 
opposition saw a shift from language to religion. Bulgarian nationalists challenged the 
authority of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul—dubbed as the “Greek Church” because 
the Bulgarian elite believed that it supported the Greek cause at the detriment of the 
Bulgarian population.  
 
The Porte allowed the establishment of Exarchate in 1870 because for the Ottoman 
authorities the question of the Bulgarian Church was an anti-Greek movement rather than an 
anti-Ottoman one. “The process of delineating the Exarchate’s sphere of influence against the 
Patriarchate outlined the realms of the Bulgarian nation in the Ottoman Empire.”53 Essentially, 
the contest over Macedonia reflects struggles over control of territory justified in terms of 
nationalist ideologies constructed upon distinct markers, namely, language and religion—a 
feature of the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 and subsequent state making wars, such as those of 
the 1990s. From a political standpoint, the Macedonian question was an integral part of the 
Eastern Question.
54
 The “solution” of the Macedonian Question by means of the Second 
Balkan War constituted also the termination of the Eastern Question.    
 
THE ROLE OF GREAT POWERS IN (FRUSTRATING) PEACEMAKING
55
 
As emphasized above, one of the most striking differences between state formation in 
Western Europe and in South East Europe is that the former processes were primarily internal 
whereas the later were highly external. In fact, as Charles Tilly has pointed out, state 
formation processes in the twentieth century may be considered to be triply external: many of 
the new states were formerly colonial possessions of other states or empires; their institutions 
 
 
21 
 
(including government and army) were built under the influence of a greater power; and the 
existence of the new states in the international system was guaranteed (sanctioned and 
recognized) by the Great Powers.
56
 Scholars are divided as to whether nationalism as a 
justifying ideology for modern state formation can be seen as one that was conceived in the 
West and then metamorphosed in East European (and generally non-Western) setting, or as 
part of a longue durée process of urbanization, bureaucratization, and evolution in 
communication and technology—in short a process intimately linked to modernity—where 
there was relative synchronicity of Eastern and Western Europe.
57
 Nonetheless, it is 
reasonable to assume that in providing legitimation of stable and prosperous Western states, 
nationalism provided also aspiration for the leaders of the emerging Balkan countries to build 
their national states in Western images. Numerous conflicts that befell the Balkans in the  
nineteenth century and the subsequent wars of 1912-1913, combined with the gradual 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire, fostered nationalism as an ideology that justified emerging 
national states, although “the national sentiment among the masses was not particularly 
strong.”58  
 
External interference in internal affairs of states is a constant feature of the international 
system. Reasons for external involvement are case- and context specific but some 
generalizations have been posited by scholars of interventions. Some of them have suggested 
that external involvement results from common ethnic ties, i.e., the external power’s aim to 
protect its co-nationals.
59
 Others have suggested that intervention (in non-military and 
military forms) can stem from the external actor’s desire to destabilize a neighbor, influence a 
conflict’s outcome, and secure resources and regional influence.60 These motivations for 
intervention need not exclude each other. As evidenced above in the case of interference of 
Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia in Ottoman Macedonia, both ethnic and geo-strategic 
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considerations can motivate external intervention. The complementarity of these factors is 
particularly evident in the rationale of Great Powers’ interventions in the Balkan peninsula in 
the process of emerging national states and afterwards.  
 
The Great Powers’ competition for spheres of influence in the Ottoman Empire took the form 
of establishing friendly states—as a means of resolving the Eastern Question. Russia was 
particularly active in the process of national agitation of Slavic people living in the Ottoman 
Empire. According to Richard J. Crampton, Moscow exercised strong influence in Bulgaria 
(also in Serbia) because of claimed ancient cultural ties and because of a sense of Slavic 
solidarity.
61
 But this emphasis on ethnic ties overlooks the geo-strategic interests involved. 
Sevtap Demirci and Hakan Yavuz have noted that Russia sought to use the pretence of 
protecting Slavic rights in order to exploit irredentist claims of the Balkan peoples with the 
aim of weakening the Ottoman state.
62
 Moreover, Russia’s sponsorship of alliances between 
Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro (in the form of the Balkan League) served that aim. 
The main goal behind Russia’s Balkans policy was to expand south into the Black Sea region 
with the view of controlling the Strait—a gateway of immense strategic importance between 
the Balkans and Asia.
63
   
 
Of the six Great Powers involved with the resolution of the Eastern Question France, 
Germany, and Great Britain, had a less critical role than that of Russia. France, for its part, 
had enormous capital investments in the Balkan states and therefore had a vested financial 
interest for supporting the status quo. Moreover, France favored the status quo out of concern 
that the Balkans might fall under the complete control or influence of Austria-Hungary and 
Russia.
64
 Germany stood behind Austria-Hungary in order to protect the integrity of the 
Habsburg Empire. Initially, opposed to war with the Ottoman Empire, when the 
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disintegration of the latter became inevitable, Germany worked with the assumption of a 
friendly Bulgarian state, an idea based on the German origin of the Bulgarian king.
65
 
Although officially a supporter of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, given the 
latter’s rapid decline, Britain came to support, and encourage, the idea of national states for 
the Balkan peoples. The primary strategic focus of British interest, nonetheless, was the 
Strait—the route to India and the Middle East—and London objected to “the establishment of 
Slav dominance and increased Russian influence over the eastern part of the Ottoman 
Empire.”66  
 
The policy of Austria-Hungary was to secure land in the Balkans not only at the expense of 
the Ottoman Empire but also to counter Russian influence. Austria-Hungary sought to 
impede growth of South Slav nationalism—considering growing Serbian power with 
unease—and to prevent spread of Russian influence to the Mediterranean. These aims 
resonated greatly with those of Italy, especially with regard to the delineation of Albania’s 
borders and Italian efforts to check Serbian and Greek expansion in the region. In general, 
Rome was favorably disposed toward Belgrade and sympathetic to Serbia’s enlargement but 
could not support Serb ambition to reach the Adriatic Sea through the conquest of northern 
Albania. As the Italian Foreign Minister Antonino di San Giuliano pointed out, “This 
pretence—we cannot hide it—would hardly be compatible with the Italian interests in that 
sea and would be certainly in contradiction not only with the principle of Albanian autonomy 
and integrity, which we constantly proclaimed and supported, but also with the principle of 
nationality, to which both Italy and Serbia owe their own existence.” Both Austria-Hungary 
and Italy were keen to prevent Serbia from obtaining an outlet to the Adriatic Sea through the 
coastal Albanian city of Durrës.
67
 
 
 
 
24 
 
Moreover, Italy in particular was hesitant about Montenegro’s expansion into the Albanian 
city of Shkodër and adamant that the Strait of Corfu would not remain under the exclusive 
control of Greece.
68
 The outcome of these diplomatic maneuvring was a new Albanian state 
deprived of the mainly Albanian regions of Kosova and Western Macedonia whose Albanian 
population has been subjected repeatedly to policies of forced assimilation and ethnic 
cleansing, omissions that have represented major causes of Albanian resentment ever since.  
 
In drawing Albanian frontiers the Great Powers proceeded on the basis of the presumption 
that preserving peace in Europe should take precedence over considerations of ethnic 
composition of territories. As the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, stated in his 
August 12, 1913 comments before the House of Commons, “the basic objective of the 
agreement on Albanian borders was to satisfy the Great Powers, but many criticisms could be 
raised by anyone who really knew Albania and viewed the issue from the country’s 
viewpoint. … [I]n the course of the efforts to find a solution, the main goal has been to 
preserve intact the agreement among the Great Powers and if the decision on Albania has 
attained this, then it has performed the most important duty to the benefit of peace in 
Europe,”69   
 
The management of the Balkan conflicts was perceived by the Great Powers as a top-down, 
problem-solving process that invoked the sovereign statesman who would construct a limited 
(negative-sum) version of peace centred on the preservation of the national interest. As 
implied in the statement of the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, justice must 
remain subservient to stability. In this fashion, Great-Power diplomacy conditioned to a large 
extent the formation of the Balkan states; it shaped the size, configuration and even the 
existence of each one of them. European powers were constantly engaged in the Balkans 
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guided by knowledge acquired in their own processes of state formation in the West and a 
vision of relative national homogeneity that was functional in the West European setting but 
not so compatible with the multiethnic composition and fluid identification of peoples in the 
Balkan context.
70
  
 
The task of drawing national borders and assigning peoples to the emerging states was 
daunting. All the Balkan states had ethnic minorities within their borders and co-ethnics 
outside them. Most of these states had also “constitutive myths that urged the re-
establishment of medieval or ancient borders regardless of ethnic demography,” myths and 
aspirations that influenced their foreign policies and sometimes found expression in 
revisionist ideologies and exclusivist policies.
71
 Ethnic minorities were routinely targeted 
with forced assimilation and physical removal. The group that suffered most were the 
Muslims. Justin McCarthy, an authoritative Ottoman scholar, has noted that at the outset of 
the Balkan Wars, the Muslim population of Ottoman Europe was slightly over 50%—Turks 
in the East, Albanians in the West. 27% of the Turks of Ottoman Europe died in the course of 
the Balkan Wars and 18% were surviving refugees.
72
 At the same time, abhorrent acts of 
violence were committed also by Muslim militias on Christians. Moreover, from 1870s 
onward Christian on Christian violence was rampant. Although the culprits of violence were 
state-armed forces and/or armed bands, the vast majority of victims were Christians.
73
 
 
Shifting focus away from these outbreaks of violence, the Great Powers adopted a rhetoric of 
national liberation from the Ottoman Empire, in referring to the Balkan Wars. This discourse 
permeated the European newspapers and analytical reports of these wars at the time that 
virtually uniformly favored the Balkan League while overlooking abominable wrongdoings 
of these states. In unison with their policy makers, the European publics were 
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characteristically anti-Muslim, not concerned with the atrocities perpetrated against the 
Muslims (whereas those against the Christians produced outrage in the European capitals), 
and fully supportive of Balkan elites aspirations of expanding the nation state model in 
Europe’s outskirts.74 
 
CONCLUSION 
This article contributes to peace and conflict studies literature by offering conceptual and 
empirical observations pertaining to correlations between state making and political violence 
in the south east corner of the European continent in the context of the Balkan Wars of 1912-
1913, which cemented the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of 
modern Balkan states. It sheds light on the root causes of these wars; highlights the effect of 
these wars on regional state making policies; and underscores the comparisons and contrasts 
between the development of nation-states in Western Europe and those in the Balkans. 
 
The South East European states—Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, Serbia—began 
their state formation processes under conditions of Ottoman decay in the nineteenth century, 
joining the society of states (nearly all of them along the current borders) at the end of the 
Balkan Wars as the Ottoman Empire was dismantled. Breaking away from a land empire—as 
opposed to a sea empire—provided for relatively lengthy entanglements between the new 
emerging states and their ruling empire, entanglements that took the form of complex 
confrontations—including war—frequently mediated by dominating powers of the time. 
 
Formation of the Balkan states was conditioned by existing practices, and by knowledge 
accumulated in the preceding processes of state formation in the Western part of the 
European continent. Hence this article has aimed to contribute above and beyond the existing 
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state of scholarship by grounding its analysis on a focused and explicit comparison between 
state formation in the Balkan case and that of Western European countries, focusing primarily 
on the initial stages of these processes when configurations of states are determined, and 
recognized, in the inter/national setting. The value of this comparison lies in casting into 
sharper relief what is distinctive and what is familiar in the processes of state formation in 
West and South East Europe.  
 
Although a peasant population base is a common denominator in the initial stages of state 
formations in West and South East Europe the time frame of these processes was 
significantly shorter in the latter than the former. That state formation was compressed in 
time in the Balkans implied greater challenges and potentially greater human costs especially 
since people had fluid identities and, initially, weak national commitments that subjugated 
them, not infrequently, to competing political projects of nation building. This is not to 
suggest that state formation in Western Europe did not cost tremendously in death, suffering, 
loss of rights and unwilling surrender of land, goods, or labour—as Charles Tilly and his 
collaborators have argued.
75
 Maria Todorova observes in The Trap of Backwardness, for 
instance, that “a process of consolidation of homogenous dynastic, religious, and ethnic states 
has been taking place in Europe since the fifteenth century … [a] process that may be 
described as ethnic and religious cleansing. Nation building and consolidation is a dynamic 
process that in Europe has taken several centuries and is not yet completed.”76 States cannot 
be formed without great costs. Indeed, just as in the case of Western Europe, nation-building 
in the Balkans exacted a tremendous human cost in the long, elusive drive toward the fleeting 
dream of ethnic purity.
77
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War has had a strong effect on the creation and alteration of state configuration in the West. 
This pertains also to the case of the Balkans. Indeed, war has been the performative force, the 
coup de force, which has transformed political and social reality, and has mediated 
delineation of state boundaries that have enclosed the political community of the modern 
nation. The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913—which historicity this article has explored—can be 
viewed as the midwife of the modern Balkan states serving directly the drawing of borders, 
national elites’ attempts at homogenizing highly heterogeneous populations, and broadening 
participation of masses in national politics. They were the most powerful tool both for state- 
and nation building. These wars can be viewed as a “creative destruction” in the course of 
which a new political order was established out of the ashes of a multi-ethnic empire.
78
 Not 
only were they a means to the extraction of land and resources, but, crucially, they reinforced 
a new political discourse grounded on the ideology of nationalism—based on an ethno-
cultural interpretation of nationhood—as a source of legitimation for the new nation states; an 
ideology that did not condition formation of the West European states. Violence of war, 
however, was not an exclusive generative force in state formation. External forces played a 
crucial role. 
 
Unlike West European states, the processes of formation of the modern Balkan states were 
not internally determined. Processes of state formation in the Balkans have been triply 
external: the new states were formerly colonial possessions of the Ottoman Empire and were 
involved in relatively lengthy entanglements with the latter; the new states built institutions 
(of governance and the army) influenced by Western models; Balkan states depended for 
recognition and admission in the society of states on the support of the Great Powers. 
Specifically, the formation of nation states in South East Europe as a means of solving the 
Eastern Question was conditioned by the interests of the Great Powers of the time which 
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prioritized stability over justice. That Balkan states emerged at a time when a successful 
model of the nation state was operational in Western Europe meant that, even if theoretically 
some other alternatives might have existed, the pull of the successful model was very great 
and therefore the maneuverability of the Balkan states was severely restricted. The 
experience, knowledge, and interests of the Great Powers endowed them with significant 
leverage over Balkan national elites. 
 
In the final analysis, revisiting the formation of South East European states in the context of 
the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 remind us, as John Darwin noted, that we live in a world of 
states made of empires and among ethnic and national identities as often forged in 
collaboration with these empires as rallied against them.
79
 Despite some relevant literature 
recently emerging with which this article has engaged, more than one hundred years after 
their conclusion these wars still remain insufficiently researched and comprehended. 
Furthering understanding of state formation processes in the Balkan setting the article has 
brought back in the role of war in such processes and also drawn attention to complexity and 
challenges that ethnic heterogeneity continues to posit to the international state system. In a 
context of state- and nation building characterized by abundant cultural heterogeneity and 
Great Power influence, this contribution has stressed the necessity of integrating these three 
aspects—namely, state building, nation building, and external impact—in future analyses of 
state formation in the Balkans and elsewhere.
80
 Viewing the early stages of state formation in 
the Balkans expands upon the body of cases in peace studies that validate generalizations 
about correlation between state making and war, and stimulate informed critical evaluations 
of past conflicts with the view of helping peacebuilding practitioners to address future ones 
more effectively. 
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